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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ACCOUNTING FOR HISTORICAL FORCES IN THE EFFORT TO
ALIGN LAW WITH SCIENCE

DEREK W. BLACK*
INTRODUCTION
During the course of this year’s Childress lecture, Professor john a. powell
identified a number of principles in modern jurisprudence as remnants of
Enlightenment Period concepts and argued that current scientific developments
have proven these principles false.1 The foremost Enlightenment concepts that
he challenged were those related to individual decision-making processes and
causation, both of which play a significant role in almost every aspect of the
law.2 This Article makes no attempt to delve further into science, or the law’s
consistency with it, as it largely concurs in powell’s assessment of modern
science and jurisprudence. Instead this Article raises the different, but related,
question of why certain aspects of the law reflect Enlightenment thinking. In
particular, have courts adopted legal standards based on their understanding of
science, albeit a flawed understanding, or do current legal standards reflect
ulterior motives that may simply coincide with Enlightenment principles?
Of course, such a large question cannot be definitively answered in the
context of a short Article, but the answer has huge consequences for legal
reform efforts. This Article simply hopes to continue the conversation.
Relying on a few seminal school desegregation cases, this Article posits that,
first, the Supreme Court’s understanding of intent and causation is sometimes
more nuanced than we currently appreciate and, second, when the Court’s

* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Education Rights Center, Howard University
School of Law. I would foremost like to thank john powell for thinking of me when he was
conceptualizing his Childress lecture and its respondents. His lecture and scholarship, as always,
forced me to think beyond my normal bounds and raised the most important of questions for our
society’s future. I would also like to thank the other participants and authors. They collectively
created a unique and stimulating intellectual environment. Finally, I would like to thank the Saint
Louis University Law Journal, its staff, and the professors and administration that supported the
lecture. The lecture and this symposium issue were managed with an efficiency and
professionalism that made my participation effortless.
1. john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1037–39 (2010).
2. Id.
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analysis reaches the height of scientific ignorance or simplicity, the Court may
be acting upon ulterior motivations rather than scientific notions.
A few discrete examples in discrimination law suggest that the Supreme
Court is not ignorant of science at all, but rather intuitively understands the
complexities of causation, and that discrimination can occur even in the
absence of an individual’s conscious desire to do racial harm. Thus, when the
Court in other instances acts contrary to such principles, it is not based
primarily on a misunderstanding of science, but on a fear that following
scientific principles to their logical legal conclusions would pose profound
practical changes.3 In particular, a more robust concept of causation and intent
would place many aspects of the national status quo at risk. One scholar
recently suggested that modern science may also pose a threat to the judiciary
itself, as science is increasingly treated as the arbiter of truth.4 Thus, the
maintenance of our intent and causation standards may be value based—rather
than scientific or Enlightenment based—decisions to protect power and
privilege.
If legal standards perpetuate Enlightenment concepts, not because the
judiciary continues to believe in their validity, but for ulterior reasons,
scientific revelation alone is unlikely to spur legal reform. This Article posits
that, as a general principle, law rarely takes its final form based simply on the
truth of scientific principles or the comprehension of them. Rather, laws, like
the very concepts of causation and intent that powell addressed in the Childress
lecture, are the result of a multitude of forces and motivations, many of which
are not always obvious. Just as courts might misplace their attention when
they focus on people’s conscious motivations as a measure of whether
discrimination has occurred, we too might misplace our attention if we assume
that scientific understandings are the motivations behind legal standards, even
when those standards are consistent with some set of past or current scientific
principles.

3. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 297 (1987) (rejecting petitioner’s
claim, in part, because it “extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process” and
“challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system”).
4. Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1373 (2009) (internal citations
omitted):
Science is popularly associated with such positive values as truth, certainty, goodness,
enlightenment, progress, and so on. Law’s relationship to science has always been
somewhat uneasy. While law has often held high hopes that science would prove
effective at resolving disputes without ambiguity, this very potential to be truth-producer
is a cause for understandable anxiety on the part of the law. As we have suggested
elsewhere, the CSI effect would seem to embody the law’s anxiety about the threat to its
legitimacy as a truth-producing institution posed by a rival truth-producing institute called
“science.”
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Our legal standards themselves are part of a larger system that has
reciprocal effects on itself. In fact, it may be the Court’s hypersensitivity to
the practical results of its decisions that explains its standards more than any
appreciation of or disregard for scientific principles.5 This does not suggest
that science is irrelevant to law, but that in those highly contested areas of the
law, such as discrimination, science sometimes plays only a tangential role.
Although societies at the time of the Enlightenment may have made an earnest
attempt to make law scientific,6 one might query whether those who made law
were motivated by a deep abiding adherence to science or truth. Surely many
were, but it is likewise possible that the order and consistency a universal set of
law could bring to society was the primary goal rather than any affinity for
science itself.
Those who must live and work in the world today know all too well that
law reflects our experiences as much as it shapes them.7 Thus, the law cannot
be reduced to a purely scientific or intellectual endeavor. Rather, the law is a
manifestation of our struggle to order society in a way that we collectively (or
those in power) see fit. In short, law is goal-oriented. If scientific
developments are consistent with our collective goals, then science can rise to
the forefront of change. Yet, insofar as the goal precedes the science, science
may be but a tool or subsequent rationalization for the legal system we desire.
Likewise, if science is inconsistent with our goals, it runs the risk of being cast
aside, derided, or questioned as to its relevance. If the foregoing is true,
securing the judicial reforms that Professor powell suggests cannot be
accomplished by scientific revelation or education alone. Legal reform will be
dependent on the ability to articulate a vision of society that resonates with our
citizenry. Science can then reinforce that vision as sound, adding support for
existing political predispositions.

5. See Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s Meaning and Its
Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533,
536–37 (2006) [hereinafter Black, The Contradiction] (examining the Court’s discrimination
jurisprudence as a capitulation to the status quo); Robert J. Delahunty, “Constitutional Justice”
or “Constitutional Peace”? The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 11, 54 (2008) (concluding that the Court’s discrimination cases, at least those by Justice
Powell, were and are attempts to secure constitutional peace rather than arrive at consistent
constitutional principles); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 260–68 (1979) (describing the internal resistance on the Court to any decision
that would provide sweeping remedies or widespread desegregation in the North).
6. See generally PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND
THE STATE 47 (Cambridge U. Press 2002) (indicating that for John Austin and Jeremy Bentham
the law itself could become a science).
7. See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Counterintuitive Thoughts on Legal Scholarship and Secured
Transactions, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 863, 869–77 (2007) (discussing the reciprocal relationship
between law and culture).
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Rather than tackling the issue of how best to achieve legal reform, this
Article simply points out a few examples that suggest that science alone will
not be the key to reform. To lay the foundation for these examples, this Article
first briefly recounts Professor powell’s critique of modern intent and
causation standards. Second, this Article reviews some key cases in
antidiscrimination law that demonstrate that our judiciary understands far more
about causation and intent than its more recent opinions might suggest. At
times, the judiciary has adopted standards and engaged in analysis that is
entirely consistent with complex systems-based causation and the limited
capacity of individuals’ self-knowledge. Third, this Article will explore why
the judiciary has strayed from these understandings more recently and posits
that the Court fears the practical change that appropriate legal standards would
bring.
In particular, discrimination standards that base liability on
subconscious bias or the effect of one’s action would pose significant threats to
various aspects of the racial status quo, including housing patterns, school
district policies, the criminal justice system, and various other structures that
advantage majoritarian interests. Alleviating the requirement that plaintiffs
demonstrate linear causation would pose the same threat. Finally, this Article
points out that the fears of change and science are not necessarily unique to
antidiscrimination law, but they appear to be a characteristic that regularly
manifests itself in legal systems. Thus, it is an inherent problem that cannot be
entirely avoided.
I. PROFESSOR POWELL’S CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND LAW
By “individuality” or “individual decision-making,” powell refers to the
Enlightenment notion that individuals have knowledge of self and are fully
conscious of their decision-making process.8 Thus, people can make rational
decisions based entirely on their conscious thoughts, free of outside biases,
irrelevant factors, or illogical precepts. Professor powell concludes that
today’s intentional discrimination standard and its evidentiary requirement of
conscious racial motivations grow out of the Enlightenment view of individual
thought processes.9 As for causality, Professor powell refers to classical
physics and the Newtonian concept of linear causation, which posit that change

8. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1083–84.
9. Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (overturning disparate impacts
“only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (setting the standard for evaluating neutral
policies as “whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor”); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“A purpose to discriminate must be present.”). But see Michael
Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J.
279, 288–91 (1997) (asserting that conceptualizing intent as racial purpose or animus is an
overstatement of the intent standard).
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occurs as a result of objects colliding with one another.10 In effect, the
collision of physical objects alone is the cause of events.11 Professor powell
likewise finds that our current law’s requirement of evidence of direct
causation is a reflection of the Enlightenment’s understanding of the world.12
Professor powell then discusses modern science and finds that its
developments have undermined the premises behind and/or the accuracy of
both of the foregoing Enlightenment concepts.13 First, modern social science
demonstrates that individuals only have access to a small percentage of their
mental processes.14 Most of the information that we absorb and rely on in
making decisions actually occurs at the subconscious level.15 Our brains sort,
evaluate, and respond to massive amounts of information without any
conscious thought on our part.16 Ultimately, conscious thinking occurs after
the brain has already sorted and evaluated the information.17 Sometimes we
alter our thinking or reject the conclusions our subconscious puts forward, but
this thinking is still generally a response to a mental process that has already
occurred. In most other instances, however, individuals fail to appreciate that
any subconscious processes have already occurred and that they are simply
acting upon them.18
Second, modern science demonstrates that complex systems, rather than
just individual objects colliding with one another, operate to cause events.19
Events that we might perceive as the result of a single force are actually the
result of multiple forces and variables, all of which are, in some sense, the
cause of the event we perceive.20 Moreover, the complex interaction of these
forces can actually result in causation loops by which an object has an effect

10. For a brief discussion of Newtonian causation, see Troyen A. Brennan, Casual Chains
and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 469, 478 (1987).
11. Id.
12. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1069–71.
13. Professor powell is not alone in this critique. Others have demonstrated the difficulty
that the Newtonian concept of causation has presented in torts, in particular, toxic torts. See, e.g.,
Brennan, supra note 10, at 490; A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 135, 136, 142 (2002).
14. Implicit bias is a concept that explains this phenomenon. For a thorough discussion of
implicit bias, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Stephen W. Kercel, Biological Complexity: An Engineering Perspective, in
SYSTEMS BIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES, METHODS, AND CONCEPTS 139, 143–55 (Andrzej K. Konopka
ed., 2007).
20. See id.
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upon itself.21 In short, causation cannot be reduced to single independent
actions or collisions, but is rather the result of a complex set of factors and
interactions.
Professor powell argues that our legal systems, however, have yet to
account for these developments and remain mired in traditional Enlightenment
concepts.22 This failure prevents our legal system from appropriately
identifying and addressing pressing social issues, including discrimination and
inequality. The issue that Professor powell does not directly address, yet is
central to any reform of our modern jurisprudence, is why the law is
inconsistent with science. Professor powell did not explicitly attribute this
flaw to any motivation on the part of those who create legal systems. Rather,
he seemed to imply that the flaw results from a simple failure of lawmakers
and courts to evolve in their thinking. In short, they continue to see the world
in terms of traditional Enlightenment concepts. If this is the case, one might
presume that the solution is simply to correct their misunderstanding. But if
this is not the case, the appropriate strategy for addressing the flaws in current
law will be far more complex.
II. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION’S NUANCED AND VACILLATING APPROACH TO
INTENT AND CAUSATION
A historical review of key school desegregation and discrimination cases
suggests that the Court is not simply scientifically ignorant. First, the Court’s
modern intent and causation standards have not been uniformly or entirely
inconsistent with science. The Court’s discrimination standards, although
currently reflecting Enlightenment notions, have vacillated through time. At
times, the Court has acknowledged or adopted frameworks that are consistent
with modern developments in science, only to later narrow its intent and
causation standards in ways that appear consistent with Enlightenment
thinking. Second, when scientific inconsistencies have arisen, the Court has
been motivated, at least on some occasions, by the practical effect that
modernizing the law would have.
The Court’s evolution of school desegregation doctrine provides a prime
example of both the vacillation in standards and external pressures affecting

21. Id.
22. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1083; see also Brennan, supra note 10, at 478;
Tarlock, supra note 13, at 138; Richard K. Sherwin, Foreword, Law/Media/Culture: Legal
Meaning in the Age of Images, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653, 655 (1999):
The belief that truth and justice are ‘out there,’ just waiting to be ‘discovered,’ is of course
only one among numerous ideas handed down to us from the European Enlightenment
that postmodern thought has rendered problematic. Notions of the unified self,
universalistic reason, and the linear logic of causation are others.
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the Court’s standards. The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education23
and the decisions that followed it for two decades required neither intent nor
causation.24 The mere existence of segregated schools was enough to warrant
judicial intervention.25 Intent and causation did not begin to play a significant
role in desegregation law until the mid-1970s.26 Even then, the Court
proceeded with caution in what was required to establish intent and
causation.27 But once the Court made this shift, it repeatedly narrowed its
concept of intent and causation, ultimately reaching the current standards that
are consistent with Enlightenment concepts.28
Science, however, was largely irrelevant to this vacillation. Instead,
external social events, as well as the Court’s own sense of its role in shaping
these events, seemed to drive the Court. During the 1960s and early 1970s,
both the Court and the federal government took the charge to combat racial
The most aggressive support for school
discrimination seriously.29
desegregation actually came a decade and a half after Brown in Green v. New
Kent County.30 In Green, the Court was adamant in expressing the imperative
of desegregation and imposed unrelenting standards for achieving it.31 The
Court “commanded school boards to bend their efforts” towards the principles
that Brown established,32 and charged school districts with “the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”33 But
most important was Green’s rejection of the relevance of schools’ preferences
and hesitations.34 Repudiating its own past conciliatory stance, the Court

23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
24. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1971);
Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968); see also john a. powell, Living and
Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L. REV. 749, 768–71 (1996) (finding that
the intent standard marked a shift away from Brown’s focus on the harm of segregation and that
nothing in the Constitution required this shift); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108–11 (1989) (arguing intent was irrelevant prior to
Washington v. Davis).
25. Swann, 402 U.S. at 17–18.
26. Ortiz, supra note 24, at 1111–13.
27. Id. at 1112.
28. Id. at 1115–17.
29. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)); see also GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1–5, 15, 22–23 (1969)
(discussing the shift toward serious efforts to desegregate schools).
30. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
31. Id. at 437–38.
32. Id. at 438.
33. Id. at 437–38.
34. See id. at 438, 440.
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wrote: “‘The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out,’ . . . The burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now.”35
While the Court was articulating its intent to force school desegregation,
the federal government was likewise applying pressure. Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination in various aspects of
public life, including, but not limited to, employment, schools, and public
accommodations.36 Congress also placed money behind this task, extending
new funds to various institutions and conditioning the receipt of those funds on
nondiscrimination.37 The funds for schools came in the form of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act,38 which provided supplemental
funds to improve the education of low-income students.39 This money, in
effect, became the carrot to entice schools to desegregate.40 With the
combined effort of the federal government, federal courts, and private litigators
and advocates, school desegregation began to occur in earnest and expand
geographically.41
Of course, school desegregation did not occur in a vacuum. An entire
cultural shift had occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, as African–Americans
pressed their case for equality through massive political protests and
demonstrations.42 Likewise, national television broadcasted the sheer brutality
of discrimination and segregation, turning public sentiment against the ways of
the past and toward change.43 It is against this legal and social background that
one must evaluate and understand the Court’s approach to causation and
individual decision-making.
As indicated above, intent and causation were largely irrelevant during the
period when racial transformation was at its height. Only when the nation and
courts began to lose their fervor did these concepts become important and
begin to shift. In the first school desegregation case to move toward the
modern standards, Keyes v. School District No. 1,44 the Court took up both the
35. Swann, 402 U.S. at 438–39.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
37. Id.
38. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 at §
201 (indicating the purpose and policy was to fund school districts “serving areas with
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational
programs”).
39. Id.
40. See ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 24, 47, 76–77.
41. Id. at 1, 24–27, 46–47, 76–78.
42. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 523–38 (2001).
43. Id. at 595–96.
44. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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issues of intent and causation.45 The Court’s holding, however, reflected a far
more nuanced approach than is currently found in the Court’s jurisprudence.
Keyes ushered in the modern intentional discrimination standard,46 but the
Court’s articulation of intent in Keyes was far less simplistic than what is found
in current cases. Moreover, for school desegregation law, Keyes was important
not just for the intent standard, but also for the presumption of intent that it
created.47 While the Court in Keyes distinguished between intentional and de
facto segregation, which later created barriers to integrating schools,48 the
Court was willing to presume that intentional discrimination existed and was
the cause of inequality even where direct evidence was lacking.49 This
presumption of intent gave litigators an important tool with which to extend
desegregation remedies longer and in more aspects than they otherwise might
have been able to.50 In explaining how the presumption of intentional
discrimination would work, the Court wrote that:
[I]t is not enough, of course, that the school authorities rely upon some
allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation for their actions. Their burden is
to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not
among the factors that motivated their actions. The courts below attributed
much significance to the fact that many of the Board’s actions in the core city
area antedated our decision in Brown. We reject any suggestion that
remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of intent. If the actions of
school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the
segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of
remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less
51
“intentional.”

In Keyes, the Court framed its analysis in the language of intent, but its
willingness to presume the existence of discrimination even in the absence of
facial or explicit discrimination is partially at odds with an intent standard
based on transparency of the mind and conscious decision-making. In fact, the
Court suggested that conscious motivations or intent are not entirely
controlling. First, the Court recognized that decisions and motivations are

45. Id. at 215, 227.
46. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (indicating that Keyes had created the
intent standard which was now applicable to other equal protection claims as well).
47. See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 966 (11th
Cir. 2001); Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee County, 111 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 1997).
48. powell, supra note 24, at 771.
49. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 227 (failing to find direct evidence of discrimination and explaining
that “the presumption is strong that the school board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part
responsible”).
50. See, e.g., NAACP, 273 F.3d at 962–63 (discussing a desegregation plan that extended for
decades).
51. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210–11.
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multidimensional.52 Race need only be “among the factors” and “to any
degree” motivate one’s action to be impermissible.53 Second, the Court did not
narrowly construe intent but instead indicated that the meaning or intent behind
a decision cannot be assessed from a single moment or thought in time.54
Likewise, impermissible motives may be subtle and emanate from the cultural
and historical context in which one makes a decision rather than from a
conscious motivation to discriminate. Third, the Court indicated that, although
actions might be neutral on their face and in the conscious mind of the decision
maker, this alone does not render an action free from bias and discrimination.55
This concept and presumption of intent produced significant consequences
in subsequent cases, becoming the tool to hold districts accountable for any
racial disparities that might exist. The past intent to segregate schools,
however far removed, was sufficient to justify the later presumption of
intentional discrimination in every aspect of a school system.56 Thus, even
when a school district had begun integrating its school buildings a decade ago,
a court would presume that any continuing racial disparities in areas such as
facilities, extra-curricular activities, discipline, ability grouping, and other
areas were the result of current or prior intentional discrimination.57 If a

52. See id. at 210 (implicitly acknowledging that decisions and actions are motivated by
multiple factors); see also id. at 234 n.16 (recognizing the complexity of motivations that underlie
school board decisions) (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 210.
54. Id. (“We reject any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of
intent. If the actions of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and
the segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in time
certainly does not make those actions any less ‘intentional.’”); id. at 211 (“[A] connection
between past segregative acts and present segregation may be present even when not apparent and
that close examination is required before concluding that the connection does not exist.”).
55. Id. at 212:
‘Racially neutral’ assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a district court may
be inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school
segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites or distortion of school
size in order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. When school authorities
present a district court with a ‘loaded game board,’ affirmative action in the form of
remedial altering of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly nondiscriminatory
assignments. In short, an assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to
be neutral.
56. See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, (11th Cir.
1997) 966 (“Since the Board operated de jure segregated schools in the past, there is a
presumption that any current racial disparities in these areas are the result of its past unlawful
conduct.”).
57. Id. (“In evaluating the Board’s fulfillment of [its obligation to end segregation], the . . .
district court must examine six areas: (1) student assignments; (2) facilities; (3) faculty; (4) staff;
(5) transportation; and (6) extracurricular activities.”).
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school district could not disprove the presumption, a court would require it to
remedy the disparity.58
The Court’s analysis in Keyes similarly strayed from Enlightenment
notions of linear causation. First, the Court’s general concept of causation
included multiple factors interacting with one another. In this respect, it
rudimentarily reflects the idea of complex systems causation. For instance, the
Court recognized that the certain actions that a school might take, including
school construction, creating attendance zones, and attempting to segregate,
cannot occur independent of any number of other forces and factors.59 The
Court noted that seemingly independent actions actually occur in conjunction
with other municipal policies such as housing and have interdependent effects
on each other.60 Moreover, the interaction of these policies combine to cause
results greater than any single policy could. The combined effects are wide
ranging, reaching beyond the immediate place and population at which the
actions were directed.61 Emphasizing this point, the Court wrote: “People
gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the
needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of
residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods.”62 In short, school district actions,
zoning board policies, and private choices operate in synergy with one another
to produce varying levels of segregated or integrated schools.
Second, the presumption of intent included a presumption of causation, as
the Court presumed that current racial disparities are the result of past or
current discrimination even when no evidence directly connects the two.63 The
Court was willing to make this presumption because of its broad concept of
causation. The Court indicated that even in the context of a single school at a
single point in time the racial patterns at the school cannot always be reduced
to single causative acts.64 In the context of the school district in Keyes, the
Court emphasized that policies in one area of the city necessarily produced

58. Id. at 965 (“Until these goals [of desegregation] are achieved, the Supreme Court has
ordered district courts to supervise the desegregative efforts of school boards that formerly
practiced de jure segregation.”) (citing Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee County, 111 F.3d
839, 842 (11th Cir. 1997)).
59. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 201–03 (1973) (noting that a school board’s creation
of attendance zones and site selection of new schools has an impact neighboring schools).
60. Id. at 202 (noting a school board’s decisions has an impact on the quality of that
particular school which, in turn, influences where home buyers choose to locate).
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Swann v. Mecklenberg County, 402 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1971)).
63. See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 966 (11th
Cir. 2001);.
64. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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butterfly effects elsewhere in the city.65 The Court understood all existing
segregation to be related in some way to current or past intentional segregation,
even if that intentional act could not be precisely identified.66 Given this
concept of causation and the butterfly effect that a school board’s action can
have, the Court imposed a unique standard of causation, whereby the school
district would have to rule out the possibility that its actions played a role in
segregation.67 In effect, the Court understood that, because school segregation
results from a complex system rather than simple linear causation, isolating the
causal role of a school district’s action is difficult. Yet, insofar as school
districts are part of the system, they almost necessarily play a causative role.68
In addition, the Court refused to limit the causation to a single moment in
time. Rather, it emphasized that past acts can have lingering effects through
time. As the Court explained,
[A] connection between past segregative acts and present segregation may be
present even when not apparent and that close examination is required before
concluding that the connection does not exist. Intentional school segregation in
the past may have been a factor in creating a natural environment for the
growth of further segregation. Thus, . . . [a school board can] rebut the prima
facie case only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create or
69
contribute to the current segregated condition of the . . . schools.

Such statements reveal that although the Court may not have developed a
concept of causation that fully reflects modern scientific developments, its
concept of causation was broader than that of classical linear causation.
Yet, regardless of how the Court’s intent and causation concepts correlate
with science or the Enlightenment, the Court’s explanation for its standards
reveals that science is not a driving force. Because both proving and
disproving causation and intent in the midst of complex circumstances is
difficult, the Court indicated that it was simply forced to choose between

65. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 204 (1973).
66. Id. at 210–11. The Court noted that: (1) where a substantial portion of the school is
intentionally segregated, the school carries the burden of proving that subsequent or other
segregated schooling did not result from intentionally segregative acts; and (2) past segregative
acts and present segregation may be connected even when not apparent. Id. Therefore, the Court
must closely examine the situation before concluding that the connection between past
segregative acts and present segregation does not exist. Id.
67. Id. at 208 (noting that a finding of intentionally segregative actions creates a
presumption that other segregated schooling is also intentional and shifts to school authorities the
burden to disprove this presumption); id. at 211 (“[I]f respondent School Board cannot disprove
segregative intent, it can rebut the prima facie case only by showing that its past segregative acts
did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of the core city schools.”).
68. See id. at 214 (indicating that it is enough that the school board’s actions were “factors in
causing the existing condition of segregation in these schools”).
69. Id. at 211.
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favoring the plaintiffs or the defendants. In Keyes, the aforementioned history
and the ongoing effort to desegregate, rather than science or any other
principle, played the decisive role. Grounding its reasoning in the historical
context in which the case arose, the Court concluded that “‘fairness’ and
‘policy’ demand no less” than a presumption against the school board in regard
to intent and causation.70 In particular, the Court wrote:
This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are no hard-and-fast
standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation.
The issue, rather, “is merely a question of policy and fairness based on
experience in the different situations.” In the context of racial segregation in
public education, the courts, including this Court, have recognized a variety of
situations in which “fairness” and “policy” require state authorities to bear the
burden of explaining actions or conditions which appear to be racially
motivated. Thus, in Swann, we observed that in a system with a “history of
segregation,” “where it is possible to identify a ‘white school’ or a ‘Negro
school’ simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the
quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports
activities, a prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights
under the Equal Protection Clause is shown.” Again, in a school system with a
history of segregation, the discharge of a disproportionately large number of
Negro teachers incident to desegregation “thrust(s) upon the School Board the
burden of justifying its conduct by clear and convincing evidence.” Nor is this
burden-shifting principle limited to former statutory dual systems. Indeed, to
say that a system has a “history of segregation” is merely to say that a pattern
of intentional segregation has been established in the past. Thus, be it a
statutory dual system or an allegedly unitary system where a meaningful
portion of the system is found to be intentionally segregated, the existence of
subsequent or other segregated schooling within the same system justifies a
rule imposing on the school authorities the burden of proving that this
71
segregated schooling is not also the result of intentionally segregative acts.

This understanding and presumption of intent and causation, however, has
largely been confined to school desegregation. And, even in school
desegregation, the Court later eroded the presumption and effectively required
plaintiffs to affirmatively demonstrate intent and causation.72 This erosion,

70. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214.
71. Id. at 210–11 (citations omitted).
72. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992):
But though we cannot escape our history, neither must we overstate its consequences in
fixing legal responsibilities. The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in
a school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real that they
have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied. It is simply not always the case
that demographic forces causing population change bear any real and substantial relation
to a de jure violation being remedied. And the law need not proceed on that premise. As
the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these demographic changes
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however, occurred slowly over time. In fact, lower courts initially resisted.73
In particular, they perceived any intent standard that focused on subjective,
conscious motivations to be illogical.74 In the immediate years following
Keyes, the lower courts continued to apply an objective test that focused not on
individual motivations, but on the natural and foreseeable consequences of
specific actions.75 Only later, explicit rejections of this approach by the
Supreme Court unified the judiciary’s approach to intent.76 Interestingly,
intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a
vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link between current conditions and the
prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good
faith. In light of its finding that the demographic changes in DeKalb County are unrelated
to the prior violation, the District Court was correct to entertain the suggestion that DCSS
had no duty to achieve system-wide racial balance in the student population. It was
appropriate for the District Court to examine the reasons for the racial imbalance before
ordering an impractical, and no doubt massive, expenditure of funds to achieve racial
balance . . . .
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101–02 (1995) (requiring evidence not just of intentional
discrimination causing an effect on African-American achievement but also evidence of the
precise “incremental effect” before allowing a remedy and focusing on “external factors” as
explanations for African American achievement).
73. See United States v. Bd. of Sch. Com’rs, 573 F.2d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 1978) (advocating
for use of an objective presumption of segregative purpose because a subjective test is
“impossible to apply”).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of School Com’rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1978);
see also Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit
wrote, “To say that the foreseeable must be shown to have been actually foreseen would invite a
standard almost impossible of proof save by admissions.” Id. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held “it
would be difficult, and nigh impossible, for a district court to find a school board guilty of de jure
segregation, unless the court is free to draw an inference of segregative intent or purpose from a
pattern of official action or inaction which has the natural, probable and foreseeable result of
increasing or perpetuating” a racially disparate impact. NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559
F.2d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1977).
75. Oliver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974) (“A presumption
of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that the natural, probable, and foreseeable
result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school
segregation.”); see also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1974) (noting that a
“pattern of selective action and refusal to act can be seen as consistent only when considered
against the foreseeable racial impact of such decisions”); United States v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha,
521 F.2d 530, 535–36, 548 (8th Cir. 1975) (overturning a district court that had failed to presume
intent based on the natural, probable and foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s actions);
Hart, 512 F.2d at 49–50. In Hart, the court used natural and foreseeable consequences to
establish intent and dismissed the notion that Keyes had distinguished between “intentional acts
of school authorities reasonably foreseeable as effecting segregation but without specific racial
motive, and acts discriminatingly racial in motive. . . . We do not think that the Supreme Court
has said that intent may not be established by proof of the foreseeable effect on the segregation
picture of willful acts.” Id.
76. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979); Dayton v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 541 (1979).
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however, even the Court initially expressed ambivalence towards a motivationbased intent standard—concluding that although the district and appellate
courts applied the wrong standard—it could not “fault” them when they “drew
‘the inference of segregative intent from the . . . defendants’ failures, after
notice, to consider predictable racial consequences of their acts and omissions
when alternatives were available which would have eliminated or lessened
racial imbalance.’”77 Thus, both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
expressed varying degrees of willingness to conceptualize and apply the intent
standard in a way that is consistent with the Enlightenment’s understanding of
individual self-awareness in decision-making.
Regardless of how one reads Keyes, the case demonstrates that neither
causation nor intent were quite as simple in the judiciary’s mind as one might
today think. Only in later cases did a nuanced approach to intent and causation
disappear from the Court’s analysis and take on meanings more consistent with
the Enlightenment.78 That this disappearance occurred, however, is not in
doubt. Thus, this Article next questions why the Court consistently narrowed
intent and causation in subsequent years, notwithstanding scientific
developments that would dictate otherwise.
III. ULTERIOR MOTIVES FOR INTENT AND CAUSATION STANDARDS?
The early years of desegregation reflect the Court adopting standards that
challenged various aspects of the status quo.79 As desegregation expanded,
however, the realization of how structurally engrained segregation and
discrimination are in our country also expanded.80 Thus, desegregation posed
a much larger challenge to the status quo than may have initially been
perceived, and the Court’s willingness to confront this challenge began to
wane.81 After taking aggressive stances towards segregation in cases like
Green and Swann, the Court shifted its approach and limited plaintiffs’ ability
to challenge segregation and discrimination.82 The Court primarily achieved
this through the intent standard.83

77. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 463, n.12; see also Dayton, 443 U.S. at 539.
78. See David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back Again: Principle, Pragmatism,
and Proximate Cause in the School Desegregation Decisions, 68 WASH. L. REV. 753, 787 (1993)
(describing the flexibility of the causation schema).
79. Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal
About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 312, 326 (2008) [hereinafter
Black, A Framework].
80. Donald S. Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern
Problems in a Post De-Segregation Society, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 117, 120–21 (1987).
81. Black, A Framework, supra note 79, at 315, 326.
82. Id. at 307.
83. Id. at 306.
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The corollary result of this withdraw from desegregation and
antidiscrimination was to protect the interests of the status quo.84 And this
concern, rather than an adherence to a set of principles, scientific or otherwise,
largely explains the Court’s decisions during the 1970s and 1980s. Time and
again, the Court modified previous progressive decisions in ways that
accommodated values associated with the status quo.85 Even Justice Powell,
who few would characterize as liberal, hinted at as much. In Keyes, he foresaw
how the intent standard might be used to bring an end to desegregation and
argued that far more was at stake in the case than a reasoned debate over
intent.86 He essentially accused the majority of manipulating its preestablished desegregation standards to produce a result in the instant case that
was more palatable.87 He wrote:
I can discern no basis in law or logic for holding that the motivation of school
board action is irrelevant in Virginia and controlling in Colorado. It may be
argued, of course, that in Emporia a prior constitutional violation had already
been proved and that this justifies the distinction. The net result of the Court’s
language, however, is the application of an effect test to the actions of southern
school districts and an intent test to those in other sections, at least until an
initial de jure finding for those districts can be made. Rather than straining to
perpetuate any such dual standard, we should hold forthrightly that significant
segregated school conditions in any section of the country are a prima facie
88
violation of constitutional rights.

He further argued that the possibility that de facto segregation is happenstance
is no greater than the possibility that consistently all-white juries is
happenstance, writing: “it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted
in there being no members of this class among the over six thousand jurors
called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not
it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner.”89
Ultimately, Justice Powell suggested there was no explanation for the
intent standard other than the Court’s willingness to devalue the interests of
blacks in favor of limiting the impact on white enclaves in the north.90 He
wrote, “[I]f our national concern is for those who attend [segregated] schools,
rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than present

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 326.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 224, 235 (1973).
Id. at 231, 233.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 232 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954)).
See id. at 218–19.
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reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools is no less
in Denver than in Atlanta.”91
The tension between the status quo and remedying discrimination became
even more evident in later cases. Just two years after instituting the intent
standard in Keyes, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley92 narrowed the remedy that
would be available to plaintiffs even if they proved that a school district had
engaged in intentional segregation.93 The Milliken Court was faced with
balancing the need for a remedy to intentional segregation against the interests
of the status quo and whites who fled from minority schools.94 The facts were
unambiguous: “Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state
and local, have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning
institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to
maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit
metropolitan area.”95 Based on state’s segregative action and the fact that
anything short of a comprehensive metropolitan desegregation plan would fail,
the district and appellate courts had found that the remedy must be an
interdistrict one, including all of the metropolitan area’s school districts.96
While agreeing that the school district was de jure segregated,97 the
Supreme Court was concerned that providing an interdistrict would unfairly
disturb the surrounding white enclaves, their school boundaries, and ultimately
“alter the structure of public education in Michigan.”98 In fact, historical
documents reveal that some members of the Court were particularly concerned
with white public opinion, which “opposed forced integration,” and kept that
opposition “in mind wherever possible.”99 The Court’s prior decisions
regarding the presumption of discrimination, particularly given that plaintiffs

91. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 219; see also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 319–20
(providing a more lengthy explanation for Powell’s personal objections to the distinction and the
earlier, more caustic versions of his opinion).
92. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
93. Id. at 752–53.
94. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting) (“[D]eliberate acts of segregation and their
consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in
terms of the usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy
would cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State.”).
95. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
96. Id. at 594–95; Bradley v. Milliken (Bradley II), 484 F.2d 215, 241, 244–45, 249–50 (6th
Cir. 1973).
97. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738 n.18.
98. Id. at 742–43; WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 341 (noting that Burger
believed “[i]t was unfair to punish [the suburbs] for it by involving them in any city-suburb
desegregation scheme”). Some members of the Court, however, felt that Burger’s early drafts of
the opinion shifted the balance too far in favor of the white suburbs, and they forced a mellowing
of the decision as a result. Id. at 341–42.
99. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 5, at 323.
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in the instant case had already established themselves to be the victims of local
and state discrimination, could have warranted an interdistrict remedy for the
segregation,100 but the Court instead shifted the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiffs.101 That no remedy was available without an interdistrict remedy was
irrelevant to the Court.102 Rather than effectuate a remedy, the Court narrowed
the import of its prior holdings so as to protect suburban white enclaves from
the judicial interposition of interdistrict desegregation.103 Thus, although an
all-black school district existed in the city as a result of de jure segregation and
whites fled to the suburbs to avoid desegregation,104 African–American
children were left with no desegregation remedy to their proven constitutional
violation of segregation.105 In short, the cost of that remedy was simply too
high for the status quo and, hence, the Supreme Court to accept.106
These same types of challenges to the status quo have occurred outside the
school desegregation context as well, and the Court has responded similarly.
Moreover, the Court’s motivations have been far more transparent in other
contexts. For instance, in addressing equal protection discrimination claims
outside of the desegregation context, the Court indicated that a standard that
focused more on effects than intent “would be far reaching and would raise
serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome

100. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (adopting a presumption against
racial imbalances).
101. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738, 744–45. Chief Justice Burger, the author of Milliken,
“believed it was time for a definitive new direction.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 5,
at 341.
102. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
103. Id. at 741–44 (expressing that no tradition in public education was more deeply rooted
than the value in local control and avoiding judicial oversight); see also id. at 768 (“[T]he Court
fashions out of whole cloth an arbitrary rule that remedies for constitutional violations occurring
in a single Michigan school district must stop at the school district line. Apparently, no matter
how much less burdensome or more effective and efficient . . . the metropolitan plan might be, the
school district line may not be crossed.”).
104. Id. at 804–06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. It is worth noting that this deference and balancing of interests against antidiscrimination
was not always so. For instance, some scholars have described Brown v. Board as an effects
case. Ortiz, supra note 24, at 1134. As the Supreme Court’s opinion states, the basis for its
finding was not the existence of intent but rather the effect or harm that segregation produced in
children: the indelible specter of inferiority. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
Likewise, although Keyes drew the distinction of de facto versus de jure segregation, once de jure
segregation was established, little deference was afforded toward white interests. Instead, the
presumption became that racial imbalances warranted redress, unless defendants could show that
they had little if anything to do with the imbalances or segregation. See Keyes v. School Dist.,
413 U.S. 189, 203–05 (1973).
106. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741–44 (finding the cost of altering the educational structure,
consolidation, transportation and financing to be too high of a burden).
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to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.”107 Thus,
the Court rejected an effects test.
These same types of concerns have occurred in the criminal context as
well. There, even when intentional discrimination was demonstrated, other
concerns have motivated the Court to simply elevate the standard even further.
For instance, in McCleskey v. Kemp,108 the Court’s previous standards would
have dictated a judgment in favor of a death row petitioner, as the evidence
showed that race was systematically a factor in the imposition of the death
penalty in Georgia and the likelihood of a death sentence quadrupled when the
victim was white rather than black.109 The practical problem from the Court’s
perspective was that the evidence was so comprehensive that, not only did it
justify relief for McCleskey, it implicated the need for wide ranging reform in
the criminal justice system.110 As the Court wrote: “In its broadest form,
McCleskey’s claim of discrimination extends to every actor in the Georgia
capital sentencing process”111 and “challenges decisions at the heart of the
State’s criminal justice system.”112 Thus, recognizing his claim would call into
question the entire criminal justice system, as it is fraught with the same racial
disparities and problems as the death penalty system that McCleskey
challenged.113
To avoid this result, the Court simply narrowed the intent standard
further.114 The Court held that showing discrimination in death penalty
sentencing overall is insufficient; the defendant must instead show his
particular jury acted discriminatorily.115 Moreover, the Court indicated that it
would not infer from statistics, regardless of their reliability, that invidious
discrimination was a factor in a particular case.116 The Court in previous
decisions had indicated that smoking gun evidence is unnecessary and rarely
available, and that judges most often must make inferences of intentional
discrimination from circumstantial and statistical evidence.117 But the Court in
McCleskey effectively demanded a smoking gun and ignored compelling, one-

107. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
108. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
109. Id. at 286–87. This analysis included data from all of cases where the death penalty was
or could have been imposed throughout the state, and it also included multiple factors that might
play into a jury’s decision. Id. at 287.
110. See EDWARD LAZURUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 207 (1998).
111. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 292.
112. Id. at 297.
113. See id. at 292, 297, 312.
114. Id. at 292.
115. Id.
116. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
117. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
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sided circumstantial and statistical evidence.118 In short, the Court modified
the intent standard and its evaluation of the evidence so as to protect the status
quo even in the face of proven discrimination.
While far from providing a comprehensive evaluation of the Court’s
intentional discrimination jurisprudence, the foregoing cases provide
compelling examples that suggest that far more than reasoned analysis and
scientific assumptions undergird the Court’s jurisprudence. At the very least,
the Court is acutely concerned with the broader social ramifications of its
decisions. With that said, it is worth recognizing that the problem of
externalities affecting judicial standards is not unique to antidiscrimination
law. Rather, the problem may pervade any area of the law where the social
consequences run high.
As just one small example, tort law has struggled with how to redress
emotional harms for over a century and questions of fact and science have been
bound up in this issue.119 But like antidiscrimination law, the struggle has been
resolved based more on the presumed effects of any given standard than
science or reason.120 Insofar as emotional harms were not scientifically
verifiable before the late twentieth century, courts refused to recognize
plaintiffs’ claims even though they could otherwise demonstrate a case of
negligence.121 The courts rejected the claims because they were more
concerned with the possibility of compensating some plaintiffs who might not
have actually suffered harm than they were with compensating deserving
plaintiffs.122 Moreover, the courts feared they would simply encourage
undeserving plaintiffs to file claims.123 Even when these practical concerns
were later addressed by scientific developments, many courts nonetheless
continued to bar these claims altogether while others simply narrowed the
available claims for victims of negligent infliction of emotional harms or
simply continued to reject their claims altogether.124 In short, regardless of
118. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308 n.29 (declining to make an inference that race
played a role because although there was “the greatest likelihood that some inappropriate
consideration may have come to bear on the decision,” the expert could not say with “moral
certainty what it was that influenced the decision”) (internal citations omitted).
119. John Diamond, Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress: A Critique of the
Restatement (Third) §§ 45–47, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 142 (2008). Even the Restatement
(Third) of Torts struggled to compensate for emotional harm: “[A]lthough making many very
significant and insightful contributions in the vast majority of its work, [the Restatement (Third)
of Torts] struggles in its reformulation of the law of tort liability for mental distress.” Id.
120. See, e.g., Black, The Contradiction, supra note 5, at 537 (arguing that, in recent
discrimination cases, the Court has created its own “wide-reaching social justice policy”).
121. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) (limiting the class of
plaintiffs who could assert a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress to those who are
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science and the legal basis supporting the claims, courts have remained
concerned with the potential wide-ranging expansion of liability that
recognizing claims for emotional harm might create.
At least one distinction, however, seems to separate the Court’s attention to
externalities in antidiscrimination law from other areas of the law: the practical
effects of antidiscrimination law go to the very core of the way society is
structured and operates. Antidiscrimination law even speaks to our social and
cultural norms. Thus, while all law has social effects, the effects of
antidiscrimination law are often viewed with heightened concern. Moreover,
this concern has been with antidiscrimination law for some time. Nothing
suggests it will go away any time soon.
CONCLUSION
In law and politics, the unfortunate truth is that being right is often far from
enough to vindicate one’s position. In the case of antidiscrimination law, this
truth resonates even clearer. In regard to race and other issues of social justice,
passions run high, and reason often takes a back seat. Too much is at stake
with legal norms for it to be otherwise. With that said, reason, science, and
justice are the most powerful tools that those seeking reform can wield. As
Martin Luther King, Jr. remarked, “[T]he arc of the moral universe is long but
it bends toward justice.”125 As such, this Article in no way means to suggest
that advocates abandon their current course. Reason, science, and justice are
on their side. This Article simply suggests that, if advocates wish to see
victory in the shorter term, past experience suggests that they will also need
history on their side.

closely related to a physically injured victim and who were also present at the scene of the
injury).
125. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here? (1967), in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 245, 252 (James
Melvin Washington ed., 1991).
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